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* Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, Law School and Department of Political Science, 
University of Chicago. Thanks to Christine Jolls, with whom I taught the case discussed here on two 
occasions; I have learned a great deal from her emphasis on expressive harms in particular. Thanks too to 
Robert Hahn, Jolls, Elizabeth Emens, and Sarah Lawsky for valuable comments on a previous draft. Executive Summary 
 
Is an accommodation “reasonable,” under the Americans with Disabilities Act, if and 
only if the benefits are roughly proportional to the costs? How should benefits and costs be 
assessed? Should courts asks about how much disabled employees are willing to pay to obtain 
the accommodation, or instead how much they would have to be paid not to have the 
accommodation? How should stigmatic or expressive harms be valued? This essay, written for a 
symposium on the work of Judge Richard A. Posner, engages these questions in a discussion of 
an important opinion in which Judge Posner denied accommodations involving the lowering of a 
sink in a kitchenette and a request for telecommuting. The problem with the analysis in that 
opinion is that it does not seriously analyze either costs or benefits. A general lesson is that while 
cost-benefit balancing can helpfully discipline unreliable intuitions about the effects of requested 
accommodations, it can also incorporate those intuitions. Another lesson is that stigmatic harms 
and daily humiliations deserve serious attention as part of the inquiry into which 
accommodations are reasonable, and that the removal of those harms and humiliations can create 
real benefits. Adequate cost-benefit analyses must attempt to measure and include those benefits. 
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Cost-Benefit Analysis Without Analyzing Costs or Benefits:  
Reasonable Accommodation, Balancing, and Stigmatic Harms 
 




Richard Posner has been a colleague and a friend for over a quarter-century. Over the 
years, I have learned that there is one thing he isn’t: Sentimental. A celebration of his years on 
the bench inevitably invites not only sentimentality but also a lot of applause; and we should 
certainly pause for some. (A terrible secret: Those of us who know Posner well like him. 
Actually we like him a lot.
1) But for this particular judge, I think, the best celebration is no mere 
celebration. I have therefore chosen to explore the topic of cost-benefit analysis and disability, 
with particular reference to an exceedingly influential opinion by Judge Posner.
2 In that case, 
Judge Posner understood the “reasonable accommodation” requirement of the ADA to call for a 
form of cost-benefit balancing -- but he resolved the case without analyzing either costs or 
benefits.  
In my view, the result of this failure was an incorrect outcome on at least one of the two 
central questions in the case, and possibly on both of them. But I mean to comment less on the 
particulars than on the general topic of cost-benefit analysis and disability. As we shall see, cost-
benefit balancing has some important virtues in that domain. It helps to expose the fact that a 
failure to accommodate a disabled person may stem from habit or prejudice; it properly focuses 
attention on the issue of potential benefits to the disabled and potential costs to the employer; and 
it disciplines intuitions that may be insufficiently anchored in reality. But at least as practiced 
                                                 
1 A small story: In my first year at the University of Chicago Law School, I was invited to a little dinner 
party at the house of Frank Easterbrook (not yet a federal judge). The party was dominated by George 
Stigler, a Nobel Prize winner-to-be and a major figure at the university at the time. Stigler asked me what 
I taught, and I responded that I taught Social Security and Welfare Law, at which point Stigler began to 
cast cheerful, contemptuous ridicule on the subject. In Stigler’s view, no one in America was poor, 
because even a little money ($7 a week, if memory serves) could go a very long way. This position 
seemed to me not only preposterous but also offensive, and I tried to respond; but Stigler was of course 
Stigler, and in addition to being a terrific debater, he wasn’t always a nice man. Seeing my distress, 
Posner came to the rescue and made some strong points, against his long-time friend Stigler, on my behalf 
– less from conviction, I’m sure, than out of kindness and sympathy for a floundering and somewhat 
humiliated young colleague, whom he barely knew at the time.  (I bet that Posner won’t remember this, 
and if he does, I bet he’ll deny that it happened just that way. But it did.) 
2 See Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538 (7
th Cir. 1995). The decision has been 
cited 360 times. (Posner taught me, among many other things, to pay attention to citation counts.) 2 
   
unreliable intuitions rather than a way of disciplining them, and it can fail to take account of an 
important aspect of discrimination, consisting of the daily humiliations of exclusion and 
stigmatization. Unfortunately, Judge Posner’s opinion shows both of these vices.  
My broader goal is to establish the importance of seeing those daily humiliations as 
imposing significant costs, which must considered as part of the inquiry into whether a requested 
accommodation is “reasonable.” The proper measurement of those costs poses serious 
challenges. But a failure to consider them does a serious disservice both to cost-benefit analysis 
and to the ADA. 
 
2. The Standard Announced 
 
Facts 
To begin with the facts: Lori Vande Zande suffers from a tumor of the spinal cord, and 
she is paralyzed from the waist down. Her condition requires her to use a wheelchair and leads to 
the development of pressure ulcers, which sometimes require her to stay at home for weeks at a 
time. Vande Zande worked for the state of Wisconsin in its housing division, performing an 
array of secretarial, clerical, and administrative tasks. Because of her disability, she requested a 
series of accommodations. Two of these were refused by the state, and they provided the basis 
for the litigation. One of the requested accommodations was a minor change in the kitchenette in 
her building, which was still under construction. Vande Zande objected that the sink and the 
counter in the kitchenettes were at least 36 inches high – too high for someone in a wheelchair. 
She wanted them to be lowered to 34 inches, a convenient height for her.  
Vande Zande also wanted to work full time at home for a period of eight weeks, when 
pressure ulcers made it impossible for her to get to work. She suggested that the state should 
provide her with a desktop computer to make it possible for her to do her job from home. Her 
supervisor refused her request. Nonetheless, Vande Zande worked at home and proved able to do 
so for all but 16.5 hours during the eight-week period. She took those hours from her sick leave, 
which she could otherwise have carried forward. Her requested accommodation was the 
restoration of those 16.5 hours. On both points, Judge Posner, writing for the court of appeals, 
ruled against her. In his view, neither accommodation was reasonable. 
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Law 
Vande Zande has become famous in large part for its reading of the “reasonable 
accommodation” requirement, which, in Judge Posner’s view, requires attention to both benefits 
and costs. This reading was hardly inevitable. The ADA does not define “reasonable 
accommodation,” and another provision of the statute explicitly refers to costs. Thus the ADA 
permits an employer not to yield to an employee’s accommodation request if the result would be 
an “undue hardship,”
3 which is defined to include “significant difficulty or expense”
4 and to call 
for attention to the financial condition of the employer. As Judge Posner noted, it is sensible to 
think that a hardship on the employer is “undue” not only in the abstract, but also in relationship 
to the benefits.
5 A burden on the employer might not be “undue” if it is necessary to produce 
large benefits for disabled workers. And if the undue hardship provision calls for an inquiry into 
both costs and benefits, it may seem tempting to read “reasonable accommodation” in precisely 
the narrow way that Vande Zande sought, as “apt or efficacious.”
6 Perhaps the express reference 
to “expense” in the undue hardship provision should be taken to exclude the consideration of 
costs in deciding what counts as a “reasonable accommodation.” 
On this view, neither benefits nor costs are part of the inquiry into what makes an 
accommodation “reasonable” under the ADA. The real question is whether the requested 
accommodation would be well-tailored to the disability in question. A modest variation on 
Vande Zande’s cost-blind approach would make costs relevant, but only in the restricted sense 
that the employer is permitted to select the most cost-effective means to the relevant end. Under 
this approach, there is no balancing of costs against benefits -- but an accommodation is not 
reasonable, and hence is not required, if it is more expensive than necessary in order to 
accommodate the disability at issue. The employer is therefore permitted to select the preferred 
means of accommodation, so long as the selected means does what is necessary to accommodate 
the disability. 
As a textual matter, an approach of this kind is entirely plausible. A cost-blind 
interpretation of “reasonable accommodation,” or an interpretation that speaks only in terms of 
cost-effectiveness, would be easy to defend, especially in view of the undue hardship provision, 
                                                 
3 42 USC 12111. 
4 42 USC 12111(10)(A). 
5 Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 534. 
6 Id. at 542. 4 
   
which might be thought to be the place where any balancing of costs and benefits must occur. 
Judge Posner worked hard to establish that balancing was required under both the undue 
hardship and the reasonable accommodation provisions of the statute. Unfortunately, he spent 
little time with the text, history, or structure of the ADA; he did not carefully analyze the 
conventional sources of interpretation in order to establish that in context, an accommodation is 
not “reasonable” if it imposes large costs and offers small benefits. He certainly did not show 
that the best understanding of the text, at the time of enactment, was that an accommodation 
would be unreasonable if the costs exceeded the benefits. Instead, he pointed to the linguistic 
possibility that “reasonable” softens the duty to accommodate, and he emphasized that in the 
ADA, the term might have the same meaning as in the law of negligence, where both benefits 
and costs are relevant.
7 Saying little more, Judge Posner essentially asserted that the same is true 
under the reasonable accommodation provision of the ADA. But is it so clear that the statutory 
term “reasonable,” in the context of a ban on disability discrimination, should be taken in the 
same way as the concept in tort law? The Supreme Court has yet to rule on the question, though 
an approach akin to Judge Posner’s has come to dominate the doctrine in the lower courts.
8 
 
Puzzles and Valuations 
Let us suppose that Judge Posner is right; certainly his conclusion is not ruled out by the 
text, and it is plausibly more sensible than any alternative. But even if so, his conclusion raises 
many puzzles. Must the benefits of accommodation be turned into monetary equivalents? If so, 
must courts rely on the criterion of private willingness to pay? Should courts ask how much a 
disabled person is willing to pay for the accommodation in question – even though the payment, 
if there is to be one, will come from the employer? What if the employee is poor, and is not able, 
and therefore is not willing, to pay much for an accommodation?  
An even more puzzling question: Should courts ask, not how much a disabled person is 
willing to pay for an accommodation, but how much he or she would demand in return for not 
being accommodated? Does willingness to pay (WTP) generate the right number, or instead 
willingness to accept (WTA)? In this domain, it is entirely predictable that there would be a large 
disparity between WTP and WTA. A disabled employee may not be willing to pay a great deal to 
receive some accommodations; but the same employee might demand a lot to be deprived of 
                                                 
7 Id. 
8 See, e.g., Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131 (2d Cir 1994). 5 
   
them. One reason is the existence of wealth effects: If the assignment of the right significantly 
affects the relative wealth of the parties, WTP and WTA may well diverge.
9  A more important 
reason is the endowment effect: Because people tend to place a higher value on goods they 
antecedently hold, WTA is often higher than WTP.
10 For lowering the sink in Vande Zande, it is 
plausible to think that the plaintiff would demand a great deal to give up any entitlement that she 
might have, whether or not she would be willing to pay a lot for it in the first instance. 
More generally, it would seem quite odd to say that an accommodation will be deemed 
“reasonable” only if an employee is willing to pay an amount that exceeds, or is at least 
proportional to, the costs incurred by the employer. It might even seem odd to say that an 
accommodation is reasonable only if the cost to the employer is roughly proportional to the 
amount that the employee would demand in return for not receiving the accommodation. But if 
WTP and WTA are not relevant, what is? Should we focus on welfare as such, rather than 
monetary measures, if those measures point in the wrong direction from the standpoint of 
welfare
11? 
Judge Posner does not address these questions. He does say that in interpreting the 
accommodation requirement, courts (or juries) do not have to proceed in the same way as do 
economists at the Office of Management and Budget. The costs and benefits do not “always have 
to be quantified.”
12 (But if not always, at least sometimes, or perhaps often; and Judge Posner did 
not say when not, and why not.) Moreover, an accommodation would not be “deemed 
unreasonable if the cost exceeded the benefit however slightly. But, at the very least, the cost 
could not be disproportionate to the benefit.”
13  The words “at the very least” are suggestive. 
They indicate the need for a serious inquiry into both costs and benefits. But how is the 
assessment of “disproportionality” to be made, and to be disciplined? Perhaps Judge Posner 
believes, not implausibly, that intuition will be enough to show, in contested cases, whether the 
                                                 
9 See Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 56 (5
th ed. 1998). 
10 See, eg, Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 
90 J Polit Ec 1325 (1990); Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. 
Rev. 1227 (2003). 
11 For an emphasis on the normative priority of welfare to monetized costs and benefits, see Matthew 
Adler and Eric A. Posner, New Foundations of Cost-Benefit Analysis (2006); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Willingness to pay or Welfare? (unpublished manuscript 2006). 
12 44 F.3d at 534. 
13 Id. 6 
   
costs are much higher than the benefits. But it is easy to imagine difficult cases; as we shall, 
Vande Zande is itself an example. 
In analyzing the reasonable accommodation requirement in this way, Judge Posner carves 
out two independent places for consideration of costs and benefits in disability cases. First, 
employees “must show that the accommodation is reasonable in the sense both of efficacious and 
of proportional to costs.”
14 Second, the employer can show “that upon more careful 
consideration the costs are excessive in relation either to the benefits of the accommodation or to 
the employer’s financial survival or health.” The second idea has distinctive importance, because 
an employer is allowed to establish that even though benefits and costs are proportionate, and 
indeed even if costs are smaller than benefits, there is an undue hardship by virtue of a risk to the 
employer’s “financial survival or health.”
15  
By ensuring such a significant overlap between “undue hardship” and “reasonable 
accommodation,” Judge Posner’s reading might well be challenged. Perhaps it would have been 
more natural to interpret “reasonable accommodation” to require efficacy and cost-effectiveness, 
and to leave cost-benefit balancing to the provision that clearly invites it (“undue hardship”). But 
Judge Posner’s interpretation is certainly plausible, and if it cannot easily be shown to be clearly 
right, it is also hard to demonstrate that it is wrong. 
 
3. The Standard Applied 
 
My principal complaint lies elsewhere. Recall that Vande Zande wanted two things. She 
wanted the sinks to be lowered, at least on her floor, and she wanted her 16.5 hours of sick leave 
back. Wisconsin could hardly claim that yielding to those requests would represent an undue 
hardship; its only hope was to claim that these accommodations would be unreasonable. To 
assess that claim, Judge Posner’s opinion requires us to know something about benefits and 
costs. What would be the cost of these accommodations, and what would be the benefits? 
 
Of Sinks and Stigmas 
Here is what Judge Posner says. For the kitchenette, Wisconsin would have had to spend 
$150 to lower the sink on Vande Zande’s floor; for all the kitchenettes, the cost of lowering the 
                                                 
14 Id. at 543. 
15 Id. 7 
   
sinks would have been $2000 (or perhaps less).
16 Judge Posner recognizes that $150 is not a lot 
of money, but he nonetheless rules in favor of the state, on the ground that an employer does not 
have “a duty to expend even modest amounts of money to bring about an absolute identity in 
working conditions between disabled and nondisabled workers.”
17 But this claim is a conclusion, 
not an argument. If we are engaging in cost-benefit analysis, why not? Where is the 
disproportion between the costs and benefits? Judge Posner mentions an undeniably relevant 
point, which is that Vande Zande had an available bathroom on her floor, one that also had an 
easily accessible sink. For this reason, the costs of the inaccessible kitchenette sink were lower 
than they might otherwise have been. If Vande Zande needed to use a sink, perhaps she should 
be required to use the one in the bathroom, not the one in the kitchenette.  But she responded, 
very reasonably, that she wanted to use the kitchenette, not the bathroom, for such activities as 
washing out her coffee cup. In any case most employees could use the kitchenette as well as the 
bathroom. Hence Vande Zande objected that relegating her to the bathroom “stigmatized her as 
different and inferior.”
18 Removing that stigma, and the relevant inconvenience, certainly would 
have been beneficial to her.  
Judge Posner was willing to “assume without having to decide” that emotional barriers to 
full integration into the workplace “are relevant.”
19 (If we are engaged in cost-benefited analysis, 
why assume without deciding? It seems clear that emotional barriers are real costs, and 
potentially high ones.) But here, he concluded that separate but equal was unobjectionable – even 
if it was not quite equal. The obvious question is: Why? Recall that the cost of lowering the 
kitchenette on Vande Zande’s floor would be $150. Surely it was an inconvenience to Vande 
Zande, at best, to have to go to the bathroom when she wanted to use the kitchenette. Surely it 
was unpleasant, and possibly much worse, to be excluded in this way -- to be unable to use a 
kitchenette that was generally in use. Why was the loss to Vande Zande worth less than $150 – 
or for that matter, less than $2000, if she sought to have access to all the kitchenettes in the 
                                                 
16 Id. at 546. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 8 
   
building
20? Where was the cost-benefit analysis? If the state had offered her $150 pay her off, 
would she have accepted it? Is that the right question? 
These questions have broader implications. A standard difficulty with cost-benefit 
analysis is that it may neglect costs and benefits that are not easily measured.
21 The emotional 
barriers to full integration are certainly difficult to turn into monetary equivalents, or otherwise 
to use for purposes of formal or informal cost-benefit analysis. But we could imagine a 
contingent valuation study that would make some progress. Imagine that wheelchair-bound 
people were asked: “How much would you be willing to pay to ensure the accessibility of a sink 
in a kitchenette on the floor on which you work?” One problem with this question is that it does 
not seem to track the goals of the ADA, which is not best understood to require accommodations 
only to the extent that disabled people are willing to pay (enough) for them. A better question for 
a contingent valuation study might be, “How much would you have to be paid in order to accept 
a situation in which the sink in the kitchenette on the floor on which you work is inaccessible?” 
In any case, the marginal value of a dollar will often be significantly lower for employers than 
for employees. Should we be speaking in terms of welfare instead of dollars, at least when 
dollars are an inadequate measure of welfare?  
Whatever the best answers to such questions, the analysis should pick up emotional as 
well as material harm. One difficulty with the contingent valuation questions is that the answers 
of a single employee might tell us too little; perhaps third parties would be benefited by the 
accessible sink.
22 But at least the answers to that question would provide some discipline on the 
inclination to trivialize, or alternatively to exaggerate, the emotional or stigmatic harm of failures 
to accommodate. The broader point is that even if measurement is difficult, a failure to consider 
that harm is not defensible. If the cost of a lowering the sink were $10,000, Judge Posner’s 




                                                 
20 Note too that an accessible kitchenette would have created benefits for other people in wheelchairs. On 
third party benefits and the ADA, see Elizabeth Emens, forthcoming. 
21 For an attempt to respond to this problem in an important context, see Fear Assessment: Cost-Benefit 
Analysis and the Pricing of Fear and Anxiety, 79 Chicago-Kent L. Rev. 977 (2004). 
22 See Emens, supra note. 9 
   
Of Telecommuting and Teamwork 
Now let us turn to the question of telecommuting and sick leave. Vande Zande had hoped 
that the state would allow her to work at home, providing her with a computer for that purpose; 
she sought a return of the 16.5 hours of sick leave for the work that she was unable to do without 
the computer. Judge Posner rejected her claim, largely on the broad ground that Wisconsin was 
under no obligation to allow Vande Zande to telecommute at all. In his view, most jobs call for 
“team work under supervision,” and there would be a substantial reduction in performance if 
employees worked at home.
23 Judge Posner recognized that with advances in technology, this 
“will no doubt change.”
24 But at the present time, employers are not required to permit disabled 
workers to telecommute, because “their productivity inevitably would be greatly reduced.”
25 
Because of the inevitable and large reduction in production, it was only in “a very extraordinary 
case” that a jury could be asked to decide on the reasonableness of a refusal to allow an 
employee work at home.
26 Judge Posner adds that the expected cost of the loss to Vande Zande 
must “surely be slight,” because it is possible that she will not ever need the 16.5 hours of sick 
leave.
27  
Talk about casual empiricism! If the question is whether the costs of the accommodation 
are disproportionate to the benefits, we might want to make some kind of serious inquiry into 
both costs and benefits. What is the evidence that if workers telecommute, “their productivity 
will inevitably be greatly reduced?” In assessing benefits, do we ask how much disabled people 
are willing to pay to telecommute? Or do we ask much they would have to be paid to be denied 
the right to telecommute? More particularly: What is the evidence that Vande Zande’s own 
productivity was reduced? Did her productivity fall during the eight-week period in which she 
worked at home? What, in fact, is the nature of her job, such that “team work under supervisors” 
is required? It would seem important to ask and answer that question to assess her request to 
telecommute. But Judge Posner does not inquire. 
With respect to the benefits of the accommodation: What do we know about Vande 
Zande’s history, such that the loss of 16.5 hours of sick leave can be dismissed as a “slight” loss? 
                                                 
23 44 F.3d at 544. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 545. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 10 
   
In light of her medical problems, a certain number of hours of sick leave would appear to be 
more important to her than to most people. What, in fact, is the monetary value of 16.5 hours of 
sick leave? Recall that Vande Zande wanted the use of a desktop computer for a period of eight 
weeks; if she had been accommodated, she would not have had to use her sick leave. How much 
would it have cost Wisconsin to provide such a computer? Surely the cost would be low; perhaps 
it would be close to nothing. (Perhaps the state, like many large employers, had an extra 
computer in an unused office.) If we are engaging in casual empiricism, we might offer a 
speculation: The cost of six weeks of use of a computer, or of restoration of 16.5 hours of sick 
leave, is not “disproportionate” to the benefit. This conclusion might be strengthened if we focus, 
with particularity, on Vande Zande’s particular condition. 
But I am not at all sure that Judge Posner was wrong to hold against Vande Zande on the 
sick leave issue. The problem is that he did not seriously ask the questions that, on his view, the 
statute required. Instead he relied on a kind of intuition, to the effect that workers must be 
supervised – just as he relied on the even less helpful (because platitudinous and irrelevant) 
intuition that employers need not “expend even modest amounts of money to bring about an 
absolute identity in working conditions between disabled and nondisabled workers.” In the very 
case in which Judge Posner established that a kind of cost-benefit analysis lies at the heart of the 
requirement of reasonable accommodation, he did not analyze costs and benefits, and he 
certainly made no systematic effort to compare the two. 
 
4. The Lessons 
 
Might we draw some broader lessons?  
 
Juries 
A tempting lesson is that the reasonableness of the requested accommodations might well 
have been left to the jury – a conclusion that would have more general implications. If the 
lowering of the sink and the telecommuting questions presented problems on which reasonable 
people might differ, perhaps the jury should have been asked to solve them, after being presented 
with the right instruction. In defense of this course of action, it might be thought that the 11 
   
conscience of the community is properly brought to bear on the difficult questions about whether 
the costs were disproportionate to the benefits.  
On the other hand, there are serious risks here. It is possible that the jury would have 
been excessively sympathetic to a disabled person, responding to her general situation rather than 
the particular issue. Perhaps the focus on the particular person would distort application of cost-
benefit analysis, or any other test, in a way that would result in pro-plaintiff rulings that would be 
difficult to justify. Or perhaps the same prejudice and stereotyping that motivated the ADA 
would rematerialize at the level of jury judgments. Perhaps hostility to disabled people, or 
indifference to their situation, would distort the application of cost-benefit analysis, or any other 
test, in a way that would result in pro-defendant rulings that would be hard to justify. These risks 
are sufficient to raise real questions about the idea that the hardest ADA issues should be settled 
by juries, certainly where cost-benefit analysis of any kind is involved. 
We need to know much more about how juries handle questions submitted to them under 
the ADA.
28 There is a great deal of room for further conceptual and empirical work here. But in 
my view, the most important lessons of Vande Zande lie elsewhere. The first involves the value 
of cost-benefit analysis; the second involves its limitations. 
 
Costs, Benefits, and Intuitions 
In the context of disability and elsewhere, both employers and public officials (not 
excluding judges) often have exceedingly strong intuitions, suggesting the impracticality or even 
absurdity of claims for accommodation. Consider those who seek medical leave for a certain 
period, or who need a special parking space, or who need a flexible and adjusted schedule at 
work, or who need help in lifting heavy objects, or who are infected with some kind of disease. 
Many such people might seem, to some, to be essentially incapable of working, and either before 
or after the ADA, their request might be resisted because of its novelty and because of baseless 
fears of contagion or nearly baseless fears of spiraling costs (and also because of an absence of 
empathetic identification with those who suffer from the relevant conditions). A great virtue of 
cost-benefit analysis, or a proportionality test, is that it puts the resistance to its proof.
  Perhaps 
employers and public officials have been insufficiently imaginative. Having produced practices 
                                                 
28 For relevant discussion, see Brian Prestes, Disciplining the Americans with Disabilities Act’s Direct 
Threat Defense, 22 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 409 (2001). 12 
   
that fit the majority who are not disabled, there is a natural resistance to changing them for the 
benefit of people whose basic capacities are (often wrongly) in doubt.  
There are two qualifications. First, an accommodation might be required under the ADA 
even if its costs outweigh its benefits – as Judge Posner signals in Vande Zande. (The ADA does 
not enact Mr. Kaldor-Hicks’ understanding of economic efficiency.
29) Even if the cost of an 
accommodation is (say) $2500, an employer might be required to make the accommodation, as 
(for example) by hiring personal assistants.
30 Judge Posner calls for a rough proportionality test, 
not a cost-benefit test. Second, market pressures should provide some help here. If disabled 
people are truly able to provide benefits in excess of costs, they might well be hired. 
Unfortunately, there are many obstacles to this happy story of self-correcting markets, not least 
because of prejudice on the part of employers, employees, and customers alike.
31  
A signal virtue of some kind of weighing of costs and benefits is that it can demonstrate 
that erroneous intuitions, or hostility and prejudice, are beneath the surface. How much of a 
burden would have been imposed by eight weeks of telecommuting? Why not lower sinks to 24 
inches, so that they can be used by people with wheelchairs – especially if the cost is usually 
around $150? A virtue of an inquiry into costs and benefits, and of a comparison of the two, is 
that it makes it possible to test intuitions, and practices, by reference to reality. 
 
Intractable Intuitions and Stigmatic Harms 
Nonetheless, Judge Posner held against Vande Zande – with a brisk, conclusory, and 
inadequate analysis of the issue of telecommuting, and a brief, conclusory, and quite 
unconvincing analysis of the issue of lowering the sinks. This presents a bit of a puzzle, because 
Judge Posner is ordinarily far more systematic with both costs and benefits. The explanation, I 
believe, lies in two places, both of which require qualification of the most ambitious claims of 
cost-benefit enthusiasts in this domain (and perhaps elsewhere). 
The first problem is that cost-benefit analysis might incorporate intuitions rather than 
disciplining them. Without a method for calculating costs or benefits, analysts are likely to rely 
on their own hunches and speculations. Recall Judge Posner’s casual empiricism with respect to 
                                                 
29 Cf. Lochner v. New York (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“The Constitution does not enact Mr. Herbert 
Spencer’s Social Statics”). Of course Kaldor and Hicks were two different economists, not one, but 
perhaps we can merge them to echo Holmes as faithfully as possible.  
30 See Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 142 (2d Cir. 1995). 
31 See Cass R. Sunstein, Why Markets Don’t Stop Discrimination, 8 Soc. Phil. & Pol’y 21 (1991). 13 
   
telecommuting, with his suggestion that workers need to perform in teams with supervisors, lest 
their productivity be “greatly” diminished. The most sympathetic reading of this discussion is 
that he is, in fact, doing a form of cost-benefit analysis, with a (reasonable) judgment that the 
costs of telecommuting are likely to be high. (Put to one side the fact that Vande Zande would 
have been satisfied with the restoration of her 16.5 hours of sick leave.) But there appears to be 
no systematic evidence on that question. Without such evidence, a judge – even one sympathetic 
to cost-benefit analysis and to empiricism – is likely to fall back on intuitions. Unfortunately, 
those intuitions may be a product of some kind of prejudice, in the form not of bigotry, but of an 
insufficiently reflective belief that standard workplace practices – even those that come down 
hard on disabled people – are entirely reasonable. If so, cost-benefit analysis, used to help 
determine which accommodations are “reasonable,” does not cure the underlying problem. On 
the contrary, it incorporates and perpetuates that problem. 
The second problem is at least as fundamental. With respect to the lowering of the sink, 
Vande Zande had two concerns. The first was practical: If the goal is to wash a coffee cup, or to 
get a drink of water, it is probably most pleasant and convenient to be able to use a kitchenette, 
not the bathroom. The second involved stigma. If most people are able to use the sink in the 
kitchenette, it is not merely convenient to be able to use that sink; it is stigmatizing and in a way 
humiliating to have to use the bathroom instead. Judge Posner trivialized these concerns. But for 
an employee, the use of the sink, in the kitchenette on the floor, may be a matter of daily routine, 
and it is no light thing to have to resort to the place in which employees generally do other sorts 
of things (not to put too fine a point on it). To this extent, the harm in Vande Zande was 
expressive and symbolic.  
Cost-benefit analysis cannot easily take such harms on board. But there is no question 
that those harms greatly matter; people may be willing to pay a great deal to avoid them, or 
demand a great deal not to be subjected to them. (I think that in any case, their value was at least 
$150 in Vande Zande.) It is plausible to say that what most matters is welfare, not willingness to 
pay, and the willingness to pay of disabled workers may not give a sufficient account of the 
welfare effects of stigma and humiliation. There is no question that an adequate analysis of costs 
and benefits would count expressive and symbolic harms, because their welfare effects are real 
and sometimes large.  14 
   
If an understanding of “reasonable accommodation” does not attend to expressive harms, 
it does a serious disservice to both adequate cost-benefit analysis and the ADA.
32 Here, I believe, 
is the most basic problem with Judge Posner’s opinion in  Vande Zande; and it is a problem to be 
avoided in future treatments of the requirement of reasonable accommodation. 
 
                                                 
32 Cf. note 1, supra. 